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ABSTRACT: This paper extends previous empirical studies of the environmental
Kuznets curve by examining the role of rising incomes in promoting development of
new technologies directed toward environmental improvements. The main result, based
on an analysis of data from 19 OECD countries for the period 1980–94, shows that the in-
come elasticity of public research and development funding for environmental
protection is positive, and may be close to unity. This finding suggests that emissions of
at least some pollutants may decline with income after a threshold level of income is
reached. However, this should be interpreted cautiously in light of: (1) the small size of
public research and development funding relative to overall spending on environmental
protection, (2) the ability of a country to substitute between public and private research
and development expenditures, as well as among alternative policy instruments, and (3)
the possibility that public research and development funding may be a form of industrial
subsidy in some countries.
1. Introduction
Whether economic growth and environmental protection are compatible
policy goals has become one of the most hotly debated topics among social
and natural scientists interested in resource and environmental manage-
ment. Alternative views on this matter have been expressed in the recent
literature on the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC). The EKC suggests
that in industrializing nations with low levels of per capita income, in-
creased emissions of certain pollutants may result when the scale of
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economic activity expands. However, after per capita income reaches a
threshold level, further economic growth may bring about environmental
improvements through, for example:
• declining population growth rates;
• shifts in the composition of output favouring production and con-
sumption of less pollution-intensive goods;
• increased imports of pollution-intensive goods;
• environmental policy as a consequence of, inter alia, better education,
the establishment of government agencies aimed at pollution control
and development of technologies aimed at reducing emissions.
Hettige et al. (1992), Selden and Song (1994), Shafik (1994), Holtz-Eakin and
Selden (1995) and Grossman and Krueger (1996) present empirical
evidence suggesting that this inverted-U relationship holds between per
capita income and environmental degradation, at least for some
pollutants. Numerous cautions and qualifications concerning the in-
terpretation of these results have been issued by Arrow et al. (1995),
various contributors to the Policy Forum in the inaugural issue of
Environment and Development Economics (see, for example, Daly, 1996), as
well as by other prominent contributors to the recent literature including
Stern, Common, and Barbier (1996) and McConnell (1996).
The main result of this paper, which analyses data from 19 OECD coun-
tries for the period 1980–94, is that the income elasticity of public research
and development funding for environmental protection is positive and may
be approximately equal to unity. This finding is of interest primarily because:
• Previous empirical studies of the EKC focus on the overall linkage be-
tween per capita income and environmental degradation, rather than
on the role of individual underlying components, such as research and
technology development.
• It may help explain why the EKC appears to be negatively sloped for
some pollutants in countries that are relatively industrialized.
In particular, if demand for environmental quality is income elastic, then
environmental research and development may be expected to increase
with income as well. Moreover, research is frequently an important first
step in identifying causes and remedies of environmental problems and in
many situations is a prerequisite for the introduction of environmental
policy. In this regard, public research and development expenditures are
crucial because the approaches to environmental problems at this level are
mainly of a basic scientific nature and this type of research is primarily
financed through government sources. Also, public spending on environ-
mental research and development can be a catalyst for private spending on
development of cleaner technologies. Although research conducted in the
private sector is often quite applied, with specific commercial objectives,
extensive use may still be made of basic scientific research results. In con-
sequence, both basic and applied research are vital for developing
inventions and innovations aimed at improving environmental quality
(Folmer and Hutton, 1989). 
Additionally, empirical results presented concerning the income
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elasticity of public research and development funding are of interest in at
least two interrelated contexts outside the immediate scope of the EKC
literature. First, public and private research and development conducted
in OECD countries may, in the long run, have a positive impact on the en-
vironmental problems faced by industrializing nations because knowledge
generated may be transferable internationally through publications, ex-
changes of personnel, or international sales of abatement equipment. For
example, there are dozens of environmental journals published in indus-
trialized countries, but read in all parts of the world. In any case, the
ultimate impact of public research and development expenditures on en-
vironmental protection is likely to be larger than those measured in the
home country. Second, income elasticities reported below may be larger
than expected based on examining income elasticities for specific environ-
mental goods considered in contingent valuation studies (e.g., Loehman et
al., 1979; Alberini et al., 1994; Kristrom and Riera, 1996), although they may
not be entirely consistent with conjectures of Borcherding and Deacon
(1972), Pearce (1980) and Baumol and Oates (1988), who suggest that en-
vironmental quality may be a superior good.
The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. Section 2 pre-
sents the empirical model, describes the data, and discusses econometric
issues. Section 3 presents empirical results. Implications and conclusions
are drawn out in Section 4.
2. Model, data, and econometric issues
The empirical model applied focuses on the relationship between real per
capita public (government) research and development budget appropria-
tions, aimed at protecting the environment from degradation (PRD), and
real gross domestic product per capita (GDP). Data were obtained from
OECD countries over the period 1980–94 (OECD, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995).
Although this data set contains no observations on industrializing coun-
tries, results reported here may be indicative of future developments in
those countries when they reach income levels that are within the range
spanned by the OECD. As indicated in Environmental Data (OECD, 1993, p.
299), PRD includes funds for the study of:
• origins and causes of pollution;
• diffusion and transformation of pollutants in the environment;
• effects of pollution on man and the environment.
Additionally, the data include research on ‘end-of-line’ pollution controls,
but exclude research on production process changes that result in gener-
ation of less pollution.
It is important to emphasize that the PRD variable should not be con-
fused with spending on protection or abatement. The latter can be
achieved with little or no spending on either public or private research and
development. This situation might arise if a country seeking to invest in
abatement or prevention imported equipment from another country,
rather than developing the technology itself. Also, public sector spending
for research and development on environmentally friendly technology
need not necessarily lead to spending on environmental protection. This
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type of expenditure could simply be part of a high-tech economy’s effort
to boost its competitiveness in the international market for abatement and
prevention equipment.
Table 1 shows means of PRD and GDP for the 19 countries considered
in this study. Attention is restricted to this subset of OECD countries be-
cause data on PRD are unavailable for most years during the 1980–94 time
period for Iceland, New Zealand, Switzerland, Turkey, Yugoslavia and
Luxembourg.1 As shown in Table 1, missing data on PRD is a lesser prob-
lem for the remaining OECD countries. Also, note that available data for
Germany pertain to West Germany for the period 1980–90 and to a unified
Germany for 1991–94. For each country, PRD is measured as nominal ex-
penditures converted to 1991 US dollars at prevailing purchasing power
parities. GDP for each country is correspondingly measured in thousands
of US dollars at prevailing purchasing power parities. Use of purchasing
power parities for international comparisons has the advantage that it
better reflects command over purchase of goods and services than would
use of exchange rates.2
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1 Measures of PRD are available for Iceland only for the years 1983–86, 1991–96, for
NewZealandonlyfor theyears1989–93, forSwitzerlandonlyfortheyears1981,1986,
1988–91. No data are available on PRD for Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Luxembourg.
2 In research on health care expenditures, Parkin et al. (1987) demonstrate that use
of purchasing power parity measures is important when attempting to distinguish
between normal and superior goods, a related question to that considered here.
Table 1. Gross domestic product per capita (GDP) and public research and
development expenditures for environmental protection per capita (PRD): descriptive
statistics 
Sample mean
Country Available GDP ($000) PRD
time series Mean Mean
Canada 1980–92 18.39 1.89
USA 1980–94 21.60 1.58
Australia 1980–94 15.50 2.60
Austria 1980–94 15.79 1.09
Belgium 1980–94 15.61 2.01
Denmark 1980–94 16.35 2.10
Finland 1980–94 14.73 1.49
France 1980–93 16.70 1.49
Germany 1980–93 16.90 5.17
Greece 1980–93 8.99 0.77
Ireland 1980–93 10.05 0.36
Italy 1980–93 15.31 2.25
Norway 1980–93 15.64 2.93
Spain 1980–94 11.13 0.97
Sweden 1980–93 15.87 3.49
United Kingdom 1980–93 14.43 2.11
The Netherlands 1984–94 15.54 4.99
Portugal 1986–93 9.67 1.72
Japan 1985–94 17.46 0.29
Values of PRD indicate that public research and development represents a
relatively small fraction of what countries spend on environmental im-
provements. For example, Rutledge and Leonard (1992) estimate that in
1990, the USA spent about $99 billion on all aspects of pollution control
and abatement, of which about $3.3 billion was allocated to research and
development (both public and private). Multiplying the figure in Table 1
for the USA (1.58) by that country’s 1990 population yields a value for pub-
lic research and development expenditures of $400 million, which is about
12 per cent of total research and development expenditures. Despite its
relatively small share of pollution control and abatement expenditures,
however, the relationship between PRDs still is important to analyse for
the general reasons outlined in the introduction.
The empirical model to be estimated is:
PRDjt 5 a 1 bGDPjt 1 ujt (1)
where subscripts j and t denote country and time period and u is a distur-
bance term. A positive relationship between PRD and GDP supports the
notion that as incomes rise, governments in industrialized countries make
investments to expand their pollution control capital stocks, defined to in-
clude information and technical know-how for coping with pollution
problems. This relationship between investment and income is similar to
that found in a Solow growth model, in which savings are a constant pro-
portion of output, but would not be automatically expected based on a
more general Ramsey growth model. 
Two additional features of equation (1) warrant further explanation.
First, this equation contains only one explanatory variable, GDP.
Explanatory variables that may be endogenously related to the growth
process have been excluded in order to focus more directly on total effects
of GDP on PRD. Examples of such variables that have been explicitly con-
sidered in related studies include composition of output (Grossman et al.,
1994), institutional framework (Congleton, 1992), degree of openness to
trade (Lopez, 1992 and Rauscher, 1992). Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995)
suggest that further examples along these lines might include government
regulations, taxes, and extent of urbanization. Second, estimation of equa-
tion (1) envisions use of time-series observations on each country in the
data set. The implication here is that exogenous country-specific factors,
such as extent of reliance on public research and development expendi-
tures as an environmental policy tool, resource endowment and climate,
and slowly changing demographic variables, such as population density,
which may reflect the degree of environmental degradation and/or public
pressure for environmental protection, need not be explicitly modelled.
Instead, their net effects on PRD can be controlled using the panel struc-
ture of the data set. Net effects of time-specific factors, such as changing
global economic conditions or concern for the environment, can be treated
in corresponding fashion. In estimating equation (1), the opportunity to ex-
ploit this aspect of the data set is important because individual country-
and time-specific effects would be difficult both to exhaustively enumerate
and to measure.
Econometric estimates of equation (1) are obtained for both random
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effects and fixed effects models of panel data (a good discussion of panel
data estimation methods may be found in Hsiao, 1986). Both estimation
approaches control for unmeasured heterogeneity between countries and
over time, such as those just discussed, that would remain uncontrolled if
least squares was applied either to the pooled data or to a single cross-
section. Generalized least squares (GLS) estimates (of the random effects
model) treat unmeasured characteristics as a component of the error term,
economize on degrees of freedom and yield coefficients that are not
conditioned on unmeasured country and time effects. Least-squares-
dummy-variable (LSDV) estimates of the fixed-effects model, in contrast,
treat unmeasured country and time effects as shifts in the constant term.
Hence, estimates of the marginal effect of GDP on PRD are conditioned on
the unmeasured characteristics. Also, the GLS estimator is consistent
under the null hypothesis of no correlation between country and time
effects and GDP, but is biased and inconsistent otherwise. On the other
hand, the LSDV estimator remains consistent whether or not this corre-
lation exists, but is inefficient because it neglects variation between
countries. In consequence, Hausman (1978) tests of the null hypothesis of
zero correlation between GDP and the country and time effects are per-
formed when comparing GLS and LSDV estimates. Finally, the problem of
first-order serial correlation (AR(1)) is investigated and corrected estimates
are provided.
3. Empirical results
Table 2 presents estimates of equation (1) based on alternative specifi-
cations and estimation methods using the unbalanced panel of data (i.e.,
time series of differing lengths for some countries) described above. In all
specifications presented, both PRD and GDP are measured in levels. In
preliminary regressions, quadratic and cubic terms in GDP were included
in equation (1), but coefficients of these variables were never significantly
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Table 2. Empirical estimates of equation (1): selected results (t-statistics shown in
parentheses beneath coefficient estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Explanatory OLS LSDV GLS LSDV GLS LSDV– GLS–
variable country country country time & AUTO AUTO
& time country country country
Constant 20.145 — 20.937 24.043 20.101 — 0.630
(20.345) (21.616) 2(3.129) (20.146) (0.744)
GDP 20.146 0.209 20.200 20.131 20.143 0.098 0.103
2(5.503) (5.991) 2(6.073) (21.536) 2(3.471) (1.677) (2.034)
Summary
statistics
R2 0.105 0.787 0.091 0.823 0.105 0.574 0.530
n 259 259 259 259 259 259 259
r 0.84 0.53 0.56 0.58 0.56 0.15 0.15
Hausman — — 0.63 — 13.45 — 0.04
LM — — 777.35 — 778.16 — 723.73
different from zero. Double-log versions of this equation also were esti-
mated and will be discussed momentarily. 
Column (1) of Table 2 shows the outcome of regressing PRD on GDP
using ordinary least squares (OLS) while ignoring the panel structure of
the data. The coefficient of GDP is positive (0.146) and different from zero
at conventional levels of significance. The coefficient of determination is
0.105. However, heterogeneity among countries and over time is left un-
controlled and first-order serial correlation appears to be a problem as the
AR(1) coefficient is r 5 0.84.
Columns (2) and (3) present LSDV and GLS results that control for het-
erogeneity between countries. Coefficients of GDP are highly significant
and approximately equal (0.209 using LSDV and 0.200 using GLS). These
results highlight the importance of controlling for unmeasured country-
specific effects. In the column (2) regression, coefficients of the country
dummy variables are jointly significant at less than the 1 per cent level
(F(18,239) 5 42.51), whereas in the column (3) regression, the LM statistic
of 777.35, distributed as chi-square with one degree of freedom, indicates
that the country-specific variance component is significant at less than the
1 per cent level (Greene, 1997, p. 628–629). Also, the Hausman statistic of
0.63 presented in column (4), distributed as chi-square with one degree of
freedom, suggests that the null hypothesis of consistency of the GLS esti-
mator (i.e., orthogonality between the random country effects and GDP) is
not rejected. Values of r, the AR(1) coefficient, suggest that first-order
autocorrelation still may be a problem in both the column (2) and column
(3) regressions.
Columns (4) and (5) show the outcome of controlling for both country-
and time-specific heterogeneity in the same regression. In the fixed effects
case (column (4)), this extension yields a negative coefficient of GDP that
is insignificant at the 10 per cent level (p 5 0.126). This result, of course, in-
dicates that after conditioning on both country and time effects, GDP has
no effect on PRD. This interpretation, however, may be questioned from at
least three perspectives. First, serial correlation remains a problem as
suggested by the reported value of r 5 0.58. Second, regressions of GDP on
both country and time dummies yields a coefficient of determination of
0.97, whereas corresponding regressions of GDP on country and time
dummies alone yield values of R2 of 0.85 and 0.11, respectively. This out-
come, together with results presented in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2,
suggests that a multicollinearity problem arises from interactions between
GDP and the two sets of dummy variables, thus making it difficult to iso-
late the independent contribution of GDP in explaining variation in PRD
(see Greene, 1997, pp. 420–421 for a related example on use of auxiliary re-
gressions to identify multicollinearity). Third, the column (5) regression,
estimated by GLS, yields a highly significant and positive coefficient of
GDP of 0.143. The Hausman statistic for this equation (13.45), which is sig-
nificantly different from zero at the 1 per cent level, may well be
attributable to high multicollinearity pertaining to the fixed-effects esti-
mates.
Regressions corrected for first-order serial correlation, presented in
columns (6) and (7), were estimated using a two-step generalized least-
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squares procedure under the assumption that the AR(1) parameter is the
same for all countries. As shown, estimates presented pertain to one-way
fixed- and random-effects cases. Corrections for autocorrelation turn out to
be computationally difficult in two-way models in which the panel is un-
balanced. In both equations, the estimated coefficient of GDP is positive
and significantly different from zero at least at the 10 per cent level using
a one-tailed test. Also, the two estimates are roughly equal (about 0.10) and
the Hausman statistic is very small and insignificant. Hence, the hypothe-
sis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with GDP is not rejected.
Moreover, the first-order serial correlation coefficient is r 5 0.15, indicating
that the transformation applied is effective in reducing the autocorrelation
problem present in the earlier regressions.
A simple approach to summarizing estimates in Table 2 is to compute
elasticities of PRD with respect to GDP. These values, which are shown in
row 1 of Table 3, were evaluated at the overall sample average of GDP
(15.12) and PRD (2.06) for each of the Table 2 regressions. Standard errors
of these elasticity estimates, shown in parentheses, were obtained using an
approximation to the standard error of a function of a random variable dis-
cussed by Greene (1997, p. 360). As shown, the column (5) regression,
which controls for random country and time effects, yields an elasticity es-
timate of 1.07; whereas the column (6) and (7) regressions, which control
for unmeasured country effects and first-order autocorrelation, yield cor-
responding estimates of around 0.75. The null hypothesis that the true
value of the elasticity of PRD with respect to GDP equals unity cannot be
rejected at conventional significance levels in any of the three equations.
Additionally, these three elasticity estimates may be preferred to the larger
numerical values obtained from the column (2) and (3) regressions, which
control only for country-specific effects, as well as the value generated by
the multicollinearity-plagued column (4) regression.
To analyse the GDP elasticity of PRD further, equation (1) was re-
estimated in two ways. First, by dividing the sample roughly in half into
high- and low-income subsamples and then re-estimating the specifi-
cations shown in Table 2, an attempt was made to determine whether this
elasticity varies systematically with income. This analysis yielded no clear-
cut results as the resulting estimates turned out to be quite sensitive to
both the method of estimation (LSDV vs. GLS) and the way in which the
sample was split. Just how countries near the sample median of GDP are
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Table 3. Elasticity estimates of PRD with respect to GDP (standard errors in
parentheses)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Functional OLS LSDV GLS LSDV GLS LSDV- GLS-
form country country country country AUTO AUTO
& time & time country country
Linear 1.07 1.51 1.47 20.962 1.07 0.72 0.76
(0.19) (0.26) (0.24) (0.62) (0.30) (0.43) (0.37)
Log 1.64 2.28 2.16 0.16 1.91 1.30 1.26
(0.20) (0.29) (0.27) (0.69) (0.32) (0.48) (0.41)
assigned to the high- and low-income subsamples or whether they are
dropped from the analysis entirely greatly affects whether the estimated
GDP elasticity of PRD is larger for high-income countries than for low-in-
come countries. Results of this analysis are not presented here, but instead
can be made available to interested readers on request. 
Second, equation (1) was re-estimated in double-log form for each of the
specifications shown in Table 2. Resulting elasticities of PRD with respect
to GDP are presented in Row 2 of Table 3. As shown, elasticities obtained
from the double-log form of equation (1) are uniformly larger than those
obtained from the linear specification. For example, in the column (5) re-
gression, the elasticity estimate is 1.91, which exceeds unity by about three
standard errors. Elasticity estimates, however, fall to about 1.30 in the
Column (6) and (7) regressions which control for unmeasured country ef-
fects and autocorrelation. These two elasticity estimates are not different
from unity at conventional levels of significance. Thus, a possible conclu-
sion from both the linear and log-linear estimates presented Table 3 is that
the GDP elasticity of PRD is approximately equal to unity.
4. Implications and conclusions
The empirical analysis of OECD data presented in this paper supports the
notion that publicly supported research and development aimed at en-
vironmental improvements increases with income. This outcome suggests
that emissions of at least some pollutants might decline with income after
a threshold level of income is reached. Additionally, the elasticity esti-
mates reported here are larger by a factor of two or three than might be
expected based on income elasticity estimates of willingness to pay for
specific environmental improvements obtained in certain contingent valu-
ation and hedonic price studies (e.g., Loehman et al., 1979; Alberini et al.,
1994; Kristrom and Riera, 1996). This comparison indicates that govern-
ment spending on environmental improvements may be more responsive
to income changes than is individual willingness to pay. Moreover, it is
consistent with the idea that public agencies can take a broader view of
benefits of environmental improvements than can individuals. 
Two qualifications, however, are in order. First, income elasticities pre-
sented in this paper actually are reduced-form coefficients that involve the
marginal cost of pollution control as well as the income elasticity of
demand for pollution control. Second, as demonstrated by Flores and
Carson (1997), elasticities of willingness to pay with respect to income will
generally be less than conventionally conceived income elasticities.
Nevertheless, these relatively optimistic conclusions concerning the link
between economic growth and environmental quality should, however, be
treated cautiously in light of the numerous general limitations of environ-
mental Kuznets curve analysis as well as the specific limitations of this
study including:
• the small size of public research and development funding to address
problems of environmental degradation in comparison to total spend-
ing on environmental protection;
• the possibility that in some countries, public research and development
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expenditures for environmental protection may be a form of industrial
subsidy;
• the possibility that countries may substitute research and development
for other environmental policy instruments as per capita income grows.
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